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Abstract
Over a hundred years ago in his paper Space and Time Hermann Minkowski
demonstrated the profound meaning of the relativity postulate – the experimental
fact that physical phenomena are the same in all inertial reference frames implies
that the Universe is an absolute four-dimensional world in which all moments of
time have equal existence due to their belonging to the fourth (time) dimension.
Since then there has been no consensus on the reality of this absolute world, which
we now call Minkowski spacetime or simply spacetime. I will argue that facing
the ultimate judge – the experimental evidence – allows us to settle this issue once
and for all.
The views of space and time which I want to present to
you arose from the domain of experimental physics,
and therein lies their strength.
H. Minkowski [1]
1 Introduction
Over a century after the publication of Minkowski’s paper Raum und Zeit in 1909 [2]
the issue of the reality1 of spacetime (or the absolute world as Minkowski called it)
– whether spacetime is just a mathematical four-dimensional space or it represents
a real four-dimensional world – is still not resolved. What I think is even worse is
that what seems to be the most shared view among both physicists and philosophers
appears to be taking for granted the existence of some kind of objective becoming
(which denies the reality of all events of spacetime) and thus denying the reality of
the four-dimensional world, envisioned by Minkowski when he proposed the unification
of space and time into an inseparable entity.
Explicitly or implicitly many physicists and philosophers regard spacetime as noth-
ing more than a mathematical space which does not represent a real four-dimensional
world. This view was openly defended by N. David Mermin in a recent article What’s
bad about this habit in the May 2009 issue of Physics Today where he argued that
1By “reality of spacetime” I mean, following Minkowski, a real four-dimensional world (not sub-
stantivalism).
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“It is a bad habit of physicists to take their most successful abstractions to be real
properties of our world” [3]. He gave the issue of the reality of spacetime as an exam-
ple – “spacetime is an abstract four-dimensional mathematical continuum” [3] – and
pointed out that it is “a bad habit to reify the spacetime continuum” [3]. Although he
did not make it entirely explicit, it is sufficiently clear from his article that part of his
criticism was against substantivalism – he wrote: “I would urge you to consider that
this continuum is nothing more than an extremely effective way to represent relations
between distinct events”. However, what is most relevant to the issue discussed here
is his view that spacetime does not represent a real four-dimensional world: “The de-
vice of spacetime has been so powerful that we often reify that abstract bookkeeping
structure, saying that we inhabit a world that is such a four- (or, for some of us, ten-)
dimensional continuum” [3].
A hundred years after the publication of Minkowski’s paper on spacetime it is diffi-
cult to explain the continued existence of views so clearly stating that spacetime does
not have an ontological counterpart. By regarding spacetime as an abstract math-
ematical construction such views effectively ignore the revolutionary contribution of
Minkowski to the advancement of our views of space and time. And indeed, if space-
time were merely a mathematical space with no counterpart in the world, we would
call the unification of space and time Poincare´ spacetime, not Minkowski spacetime,
because it was Poincare´ who first noticed in his paper Sur la dynamique de l’e´lectron
(before July 23, 1905 when he submitted the paper) that the Lorentz transformations
had a geometric interpretation as rotations in what he seemed to have regarded as
an abstract four-dimensional space [4, 168]. Poincare´ appeared to have seen nothing
revolutionary in the idea of a mathematical four-dimensional space since he believed
that our physical theories are only convenient descriptions of the world and therefore
it is really a matter of convenience and our choice which theory we would use. Here
is Poincare´’s own explanation [5]:
It quite seems, indeed, that it would be possible to translate our physics
into the language of geometry of four dimensions. Attempting such a
translation would be giving oneself a great deal of trouble for little profit,
and I will content myself with mentioning Hertz’s mechanics, in which
something of the kind may be seen. Yet, it seems that the translation
would always be less simple than the text, and that it would never lose the
appearance of a translation, for the language of three dimensions seems the
best suited to the description of our world, even though that description
may be made, in case of necessity, in another idiom.
That Minkowski did not regard the absolute world implied by the relativity prin-
ciple, as he argued, as an abstract four-dimensional continuum is seen even from the
following general argument. Had he believed, like Poincare´, that uniting space and
time into a four-dimensional space was only a convenient mathematical abstraction,
he would not have written a paper whose title and content were devoted to something
the main idea of which had already been published by Poincare´ two years (and written
more than three years) before Minkowski’s talk on space and time given on September
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21, 1908, and would not have begun his paper with the now famous introduction,
which unequivocally announced the revolution in our views on space and time: “From
now onwards space by itself and time by itself will recede completely to become mere
shadows and only a type of union of the two will still stand independently on its own”
[1].
However, the most convincing argument that Minkowski regarded the absolute
four-dimensional world as real was provided by himself – he stressed that the strength
of the new views of space and time he proposed comes from experimental physics [1]. So
a century ago Minkowski was the first human (and please note – a mathematician) who
faced the ultimate judge – the experimental evidence – on the issue of the ontological
status of space and time. He did that by discussing one of the most important pieces
of experimental evidence in the twentieth century – the negative result of the “famous
interference experiment of Michelson” [1] that was carried out to detect the motion
of the Earth with respect to the aether. Minkowski reviewed how Lorentz tried to
explain it through a hypothesis that the arm of the interferometer used contracts in
the direction of the Earth’s motion due the contraction of its constituents (Lorentz used
electrons to demonstrate the contraction hypothesis). Here is exactly how Minkowski
realized that the experimental evidence forced upon us the new concept of space and
time [1]:
Lorentz called t′, which is a combination of x and t, local time of the
uniformly moving electron, and associated a physical construction with this
concept for a better understanding of the contraction hypothesis. However,
it is to the credit of A. Einstein who first realized clearly that the time of
one of the electrons is as good as that of the other, i.e. that t and t′
should be treated equally. With this, time was deposed from its status as
a concept unambiguously determined by the phenomena. The concept of
space was shaken neither by Einstein nor by Lorentz . . .
It was Minkowski who first made that attack on the concept of space when he
realized that the postulated by Einstein equal reality of the time t of an object believed
to be at rest with respect to the aether and the time t′ of an object in uniform motion
was the profound physical meaning of the experimental impossibility to detect the
motion of the Earth in the aether. Minkowski pondered over the implications of the
fact that objects in relative motion have different (equally real) times and arrive at
the inescapable conclusion – if there exist more than one time, there should exist
more than one space as well. Minkowski explained [1] that in the case of two inertial
reference frames in relative motion along their x-axes
one can call t′ time, but then must necessarily, in connection with this,
define space by the manifold of three parameters x′, y, z in which the laws of
physics would then have exactly the same expressions by means of x′, y, z, t′
as by means of x, y, z, t. Hereafter we would then have in the world no
more the space, but an infinite number of spaces analogously as there is an
infinite number of planes in three-dimensional space. Three-dimensional
geometry becomes a chapter in four-dimensional physics. You see why I
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said at the beginning that space and time will recede completely to become
mere shadows and only a world in itself will exist.
Minkowski first realized the important hidden message in the experimental fact
that physical phenomena are the same in all inertial reference frames (which Einstein
merely stated in the relativity postulate without explaining it) – the experimental fact
implies that the Universe is an absolute four-dimensional world in which space and time
are inseparably amalgamated; only in such a world one can talk about many spaces
and many times. And indeed, physical phenomena are the same in all inertial reference
frames because every inertial observer describes the phenomena in his reference frame
(i.e. in his own space and time) in which he is at rest. For example, the Earth is at
rest with respect to its space and therefore all experiments confirm this state of rest.
Minkowski noted that “I think the word relativity postulate used for the requirement
of invariance under the group Gc is very feeble. Since the meaning of the postulate
is that through the phenomena only the four-dimensional world in space and time is
given, but the projection in space and in time can still be made with a certain freedom,
I want to give this affirmation rather the name the postulate of the absolute world”
[1].
Since Minkowski arrived at the new view of space and time – that we live in an ab-
solute four-dimensional world – when he faced the ultimate judge (a single experiment
at that time), it is difficult to understand how what now appears to be a widespread
view could still regard spacetime as nothing more than a mathematical continuum
given the fact that we have at out disposal more experiments that confirmed the rel-
ativistic effects. A century after Minkowski’s insight I think it will be fair to take
our turn and also face the ultimate judge on the reality of spacetime. We owe this to
Minkowski.
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the theory of relativity
would be impossible if the world were three-dimensional. Sections 2 shows how rela-
tivity of simultaneity is possible only in a four-dimensional world. Section 3 revisits
Minkowski’s explanation of length contraction and discusses a more visualized ver-
sion of his explanation through a thought experiment involving a meter stick, which
demonstrates that no length contraction would be possible if the meter stick existed
as a three-dimensional body.
2 Relativity of Simultaneity
Although no specially designed experiments have been carried out to test relativity
of simultaneity, this major consequence of special relativity can be regarded as an
experimental fact for two reasons:
• The experimental fact captured in the relativity postulate – physical phenom-
ena are the same in all inertial reference frames – implies, as Minkowski demon-
strated, that physical objects in relative motion have their own spaces and times,
which can be explained if it is assumed that what exists is a four-dimensional
world. But as a space constitutes a class of simultaneous events, it follows that
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relativity of simultaneity is a consequence of the existence of many spaces and
therefore ultimately a consequence of the experimental fact of the invariance of
physical phenomena, which is reflected in the relativity postulate.
• As we will see in Sections 3 length contraction, which have been experimentally
confirmed, is a specific manifestation of relativity of simultaneity.
In order to understand fully why, unlike Poincare´, Minkowski appeared to have
realized that special relativity would be impossible in a three-dimensional world, is to
ask explicitly the questions that Minkowski appeared to have implicitly considered –
“What is the world?” and “How does the new concept of space and time affect our
view of what exists?”
Concerning the first question, it seems we do not have much choice – most of those
who regard spacetime as nothing more than a mathematical device appear (explicitly
or implicitly) to hold the presentist view according to which the Universe is a single
three-dimensional world defined as everything that exists simultaneously at the con-
stantly changing moment ‘now’. Minkowski might have started with this view too.
Then, the answer to the second question follows naturally – the fact that objects in rel-
ative motion have different spaces (i.e. different classes of simultaneous events) implies
that they have different three-dimensional worlds. But this is only possible if these
worlds are different three-dimensional “cross sections” of an absolute four-dimensional
world; it is impossible to have many spaces and times and relativity of simultaneity in
a three-dimensional world. Indeed, if the world were three-dimensional (i.e., if space-
time were not representing a real four-dimensional world and were just an abstract
mathematical space), there would exist one space and one absolute class of simulta-
neous events (since a three-dimensional space constitutes a single class of absolutely
simultaneous events) in contradiction with relativity.
It should be stressed that the above argument is irrefutable only if the existence
of physical objects and the world itself is regarded as absolute – only then the rel-
ativistic fact that observers in relative motion have different spaces and therefore
different classes of simultaneous events implies an absolute four-dimensional world.
But if existence is relativized, it appears to follow that relativity is possible in a three
dimensional world – every observer would acknowledge the existence of only his own
space (and three-dimensional world) and would deny the existence of the spaces (and
the three-dimensional worlds) of the other observers in relative motion. So it appears
that relativity of simultaneity (and therefore length contraction as well) can be ex-
plained either (i) in terms of absolute existence (in this case relativity of simultaneity
implies a four-dimensional world – Minkowski’s explanation) or (ii) in terms of rela-
tive existence (in this case the three-dimensionality of the world would be preserved –
what exists for each of the inertial observers in relative motion would be his relativized
three-dimensional world).
It might be tempting to take the relativization of existence seriously since it pre-
serves the pre-relativistic (presentist) view that what exists is a three-dimensional
world; moreover, originally Einstein formulated special relativity in a three-dimensional
language. But a careful analysis shows that that option contradicts the experiments
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that confirmed the twin paradox [6, Chap. 5]. In fact, it can be immediately shown
that the idea of relativization of existence is not a serious alternative to the deep in-
tuition that the very essence of existence makes it impossible to regard it as relative.
If we assume that relativization of existence is the correct interpretation of relativity
of simultaneity (which means that for every observer only his three-dimensional world
would exist), we arrive at total nonsense when we ask what exists for an observer in
general relativity.
Let us consider a single inertial observer and assume that what exists relative
to the observer is his three-dimensional world, i.e. his present. In flat spacetime an
inertial observer is represented by a straight worldtube and the presents corresponding
to different moments of the proper time of the observer are parallel to one another
and do not intersect. In curved spacetime, however, the worldtube of any observer is
curved, which means that the presents at different moments of the observer’s proper
time intersect one another. As a result, some events which were past at a given
moment would be future at a later moment. This nonsensical conclusion follows from
the assumption that reality for an observer in general relativity is a three-dimensional
world. Therefore considering even a single observer in general relativity rules out
presentism and also its relativized version since the view that existence should be
relativized regards the world of an observer as three-dimensional2.
After ruling out relativization of existence, the only way to interpret relativity
of simultaneity (i.e. the fact that observers in relative motion have different spaces
and times) is Minkowski’s interpretation – that the classes of simultaneous events (i.e.
the spaces) of observers in relative motion are “cross sections” of an absolute four-
dimensional world. Let me stress that there is no alternative to this interpretation – if
one assumed that spacetime were a mathematical device and that the Universe were
a three-dimensional world, there would exist one (i.e. absolute) space and therefore
one (i.e. absolute) class of simultaneous events in contradiction with the experimental
evidence that physical laws are the same in all inertial reference frames.
In the sixties [7] and [8] pointed out that relativity of simultaneity does imply a
four-dimensional world. In fact, their relativity of simultaneity argument, as we have
seen, follows from the more general analysis (the existence of many spaces) that led
Minkowski to the idea of spacetime. Like Minkowski’s analysis, their argument has
not been fully appreciated. Many physicists and philosophers have been refusing to
accept the reality of the four-dimensional world of relativity, but have not explained
how relativity of simultaneity would be possible if the world were three-dimensional.
An example is Stein’s criticism of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument [9], [10]. He correctly
pointed out that one could not talk about distant present events in relativity but
seemed to believe that he refuted the Rietdijk-Putnam argument (which, in essence,
is Minkowski’s argument) and some philosophers agreed with him. What he certainly
refuted, however, is the presentist view according to which what exists is a single class
of distant present events. Unfortunately, Stein criticized Rietdijk and Putnam for
2This argument can be also explained in the case of accelerated observers in special relativity [6,
150-152] since an accelerated observer is represented by a curved worldtube in flat spacetime and
therefore the presents corresponding to different events of the observer’s worldtube intersect.
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arguing that relativity of simultaneity implies a four-dimensional world, but explained
neither how relativity of simultaneity would be possible if the world were not four-
dimensional nor what the dimensionality of the world according to relativity would
be.
So, when one explicitly asks the two questions above – what our view of the
world is and how that view is affected by relativity – it follows that relativity of
simultaneity is a manifestation of the four-dimensionality of the world (i.e. of the
reality of spacetime) as Minkowski pointed out. Due the equal existence of all events
of spacetime, observers in relative motion can regard different “cross sections” of it
as their classes of simultaneous events (i.e. as their spaces). If there existed just
one class of privileged (due to their existence) events all observers in relative motion
would share that class and no relativity of simultaneity would be possible. When this is
taken into account it becomes evident that the lack of an objectively privileged class of
simultaneous events implies not only relativity of simultaneity, but also conventionality
of simultaneity. This should be specifically emphasized since, I think, any claim that
simultaneity is relative but not conventional would amount to a contradiction in terms
– there exists no objectively privileged class of simultaneous events (due to relativity
of simultaneity), but there exists an objectively privileged class of simultaneous events
(due to the non-conventionality of simultaneity).
The relativity of simultaneity argument can be also used to rule out a theory
proposed by Broad in 1923, which “accepts the reality of the present and the past,
but holds that the future is simply nothing at all” [11]. Broad’s growing (or evolving)
block universe model of the world has been recently revived by several physicists
[12], [13], [14] as what appears to be the last remaining alternative to the Minkowski
absolute four-dimensional world. The recent versions of the growing block universe
claim (excluding [13]) that they do not allow any form of a preferred structure. But if it
is explicitly assumed that the existence of physical bodies is absolute, this claim cannot
be supported. The hypersurface on the edge of the growing universe, on which the
birthing (or coming into being) of events happens, constitutes an objectively privileged
class of events (due to the absoluteness of existence), which contradicts relativity. Also,
the growing block universe model leads to the same nonsense when used to explain
what exists for an accelerated observer in flat spacetime or for an observer in curved
spacetime.
3 Length Contraction
Length contraction was experimentally tested, along with time dilation, by the muon
experiment in the muon reference frame (see for instance [15]). With this in mind, let
us now ask whether this relativistic effect would be possible if a body, subjected to
length contraction, were what we perceive – a three-dimensional object.
The essence of Minkowski’s explanation of the deep physical meaning of length
contraction of two bodies is that it is a manifestation of the reality of the bodies’
worldtubes (Minkowski called them strips). This can be best understood from Fig. 1
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Fig. 1Figure 1: In Minkowski’s paper Space and Time Fig. 1, part of which is reproduced
here, represents two bodies or Lorentzian electrons by their worldtubes or as Minkowski
called them (world) strips.
of his paper (the right-hand part of which is reproduced in Fig. 1 here) – length
contraction would be impossible if the worldtubes of the two bodies, represented by
the vertical and the inclined strips in Fig. 1, did not exist and were nothing more than
“abstract geometric constructions” [3]. To see this even more clearly consider only the
body represented by the vertical worldtube. The three-dimensional cross-section PP ,
resulting from the intersection of the body’s worldtube and the space of an observer
at rest with respect to the body, is the body’s proper length. The three-dimensional
cross-section P ′P ′, resulting from the intersection of the body’s worldtube and the
space of an observer moving with respect to the body, is the relativistically contracted
length of the body measured by that observer. Minkowski stressed that “this is the
meaning of the Lorentzian hypothesis of the contraction of electrons in motion” [1] and
“that the Lorentzian hypothesis is completely equivalent to the new concept of space
and time, which makes it much easier to understand” [1]. The worldtube of the body
must be real in order that length contraction be possible because, while measuring
the same body, the two observers in relative motion measure two three-dimensional
bodies represented by the “cross-sections” PP and P ′P ′ in Fig. 1.
0 50 100
0 50 100
5050                        0 100
Figure 2: An ordinary meter stick.
This is not so surprising when one takes into account relativity of simultaneity
and the fact that a spatially extended three-dimensional object is defined in terms of
simultaneity – all parts of a body taken simultaneously at a given moment (so length
contraction is indeed a specific manifestation of relativity of simultaneity). If the
worldtube of the body were an abstract geometric construction and what existed were a
single three-dimensional body (a single class of simultaneous events) represented by the
proper cross-section PP , both observers would measure the same three-dimensional
body, i.e. the same class of simultaneous events, which means that simultaneity would
be absolute.
That length contraction of a body would be impossible if the body existed as a
three-dimensional object (not a worldtube) can be perhaps better demonstrated by
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the following thought experiment, which is a more visualized version of Minkowski
explanation. An ordinary meter stick (Fig. 2) is at rest with respect to an observer
A. What is shown in Fig. 2 is what we perceive and take for granted that it is what
really exists. According to Minkowski, however, the meter stick exists equally at all
moments of its history and what is ultimately real is the worldtube of the meter stick
as shown in Fig. 3.
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Space
Time
Figure 3: The worldtube of the meter stick.
Assume that another meter stick at rest in another observer’s (observer B’s) refer-
ence frame moves relative to the first one at a distance 1 mm above it. Let us assume
that at the event M the middle point of B’s meter stick is instantaneously above the
middle point of A’s meter stick. Imagine also that lights are installed inside A’s meter
stick, which simultaneously change their color at every instant in A’s frame. At the
event of the meeting M all lights are simultaneously red in A’s frame. At all previous
moments all lights were green. At all moments after the meeting all lights will be
blue. When A and B meet at event M this event is present for both of them. At
that moment the present meter stick for A is red (that is, all parts of A’s meter stick,
which exist simultaneously for A, are red). All moments before M when all lights of
the meter were green are past for A, whereas all moments when the meter stick will
be blue are in A’s future.
0 50 100
0 50 100
5050                        0 100
Figure 4: Relativistically contracted meter stick measured by observer B.
Imagine that, instead of lights, B’s meter stick contains cameras at every point
along its length. At the events of the meeting M all cameras take snapshots of the parts
of A’s meter stick which the cameras face. All snapshots are taken simultaneously in
B’s reference frame.
Even without looking at the pictures taken by the cameras, it is clear that not
all pictures will show a red part of A’s meter stick, because what is simultaneous for
A is not simultaneous for B. When B assembles the picture of A’s meter stick from
the pictures of all cameras it would show two things as depicted in Fig 4 – (i) A’s
meter stick photographed by B is shorter, and (ii) only the middle part of the picture
of A’s meter stick is red; half is green and the other half is blue. So what is past
(green), present (red), and future (blue) for A exists simultaneously as present for B.
But this is only possible if the meter stick is the worldtube as shown in Fig. 5. The
instantaneous space of B corresponding to the event M intersects the worldtube of
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the meter stick at an angle and the resulting three-color “cross section” is what is
measured by B – a different three-dimensional meter stick, which is shorter3 than the
meter stick measured by A.
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Figure 5: The worldtube of the meter stick with different colors.
It should be stressed as strongly as possible that no length contraction would be
possible if the meter stick’s worldtube did not exist as a four-dimensional object. If the
meter stick were a three-dimensional object, both observers would measure the same
three-dimensional meter stick (the same set of simultaneously existing parts of the
meter stick), which would mean that the observers would share the same (absolute)
class of simultaneous events in a clear contradiction with relativity [16].
As length contraction implies that physical objects are worldtubes it would pro-
vide further support to the arguments that relativity favours (i) perdurantism over
endurantism [17], and (ii) the worm theory over the stage theory [18].
Conclusion
Minkowski arrived at the new concept of space and time by analyzing a single experi-
ment – the impossibility to detect the motion of the Earth with respect to the aether.
A century after him it is our turn to face the greater number of relativistic experi-
ments which are at our disposal. Instead of leaving the resolution of the issue of the
reality of spacetime to the next generations we can start working on its implications
for science, philosophy, and our entire world view. Refusing to face the implications
of Minkowski’s view because of the huge challenges they pose, and trying to squeeze
Nature into our pre-set and deceivingly comfortable views of the world should not be
an option for anyone in the 21st century.
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